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Showing posts with label failed brands. Show all posts
Showing posts with label failed brands. Show all posts

Friday, October 21, 2011

Brand Update : RIP Tata Indicom ( 2006-2011)

Tata Indicom is dead. The CDMA brand from Tata Teleservices is going to be integrated ( migrated / replaced/exorcised) to Tata Docomo. According to various newsreports, the Indicom brand will be killed and the entire mobile telephony and related services will be brought under the Tata Docomo brand. 
By bringing the entire services under a common brand, Tata Teleservices will be able to reduce the marketing costs and avoid brand confusion. 
But a dead brand is a dead brand. For me every dead brand is a failed brand. 

The new move also marks the larger role played by NTT Docomo in the mobile services JV with the Tata. The branding to Tata Docomo shows the prominence of DoCoMo brand which is the primary brand and Tata brand name is being used as an endorser brand. 
Tata Indicom as a brand was not able to create any strong image in the consumer mindspace. The poor quality ads and confused positioning put the brand way behind aggressive competitors like Vodafone, Idea and Airtel. But compared to Tata Indicom , DoCoMo is an aggressive brand and the promotions are clutter-breaking. By bringing all services under a single brand especially in a low-margin, highly competitive market like cellular services make immense business sense. 

CDMA services also did not quite clicked in the Indian market and consumers were not convinced about the technological supremacy of CDMA over GSM. Now that Tata Teleservices got a foothold over the GSM services through the Docomo JV, the relevance of Tata Indicom's CDMA services has diminished considerably. I wouldn't be surprised if the entire CDMA services will be put in the backburner by Tata Teleservices. 

RIP Tata Indicom ..

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Friday, July 22, 2011

Brand Update : RIP Sparsh (2006-2008)



Sparsh which was expected to give a tough competition to Johnson & Johnson is history. Infact the brand was dead within a year of its launch. The brand was silently put to rest by Marico and there is no mention of the brand in the company website.

Sparsh was a serious foray by Marico in the baby personal care segment. The segment is hugely attractive with a major disadvantage - which is the presence of Johnson & Johnson. And it is really amazing to see that the brand equity of J&J is such a powerful entry barrier that even the best of FMCG marketers cannot break the stronghold of J&J in the segment.
Marico is not an ordinary player. The company had proven its marketing acumen with its successful brand portfolio. But in the case of Sparsh, the company had to beat a retreat. And beating a retreat in the baby segment market is one of the biggest mistake that  a brand can make.By withdrawing, the brand is breaking the trust factor which is very vital in surviving in this segment.
Sparsh could not survive because mothers preferred to be loyal to J&J because of the trust that J&J brand had with the consumers. It is not easy for a new brand to break that bonding. Wipro tried with its Baby Soft but was not successful. Now Sparsh bite the dust fighting the giant. 
So is it not possible to fight a giant like J&J ?. Theoretically it is possible. But it takes long years and millions of cash to be the profitable No.2 in the market . Not many companies were willing to burn that much cash. Although Sparsh is now dead, there are reports of a possible rejuvenation of the brand. It would have been wise if the brand fought really hard and stayed put in the market rather than surrender meekly within a year of launch.

Related Brand
Sparsh

Thursday, July 7, 2011

Ruf N Tuf : Struggling to Survive

Brand : Ruf N Tuf
Company : Arvind Mills

Brand Analysis Count : # 488

Ruf N Tuf  was an innovative brand which virtually revolutionized the Indian jeans market. It was also a brand which ultimately failed to capitalize on the tremendous growth that it created. Born in 1995, Ruf N Tuf was India's first Ready To Stitch jeans brand. Ruf N Tuf along with Newport Jeans virtually made the jeans category penetrate into the semi-urban and rural markets.

During the 90's jeans gained much prominence in the urban markets. Although there were enough room for all the players in the market, Arvind mills felt the need to expand the market by targeting the rural/semi urban market. The strategy was partly driven by the increased competition from the urban market by well known global labels.
Ruf N Tuf was a brilliant idea. The concept was to sell the ready-to-stitch jeans to the consumers who were not accustomed to buying readymade clothes. The ready-to-stitch brand was very affordable and broke the price barrier for this category. Jeans were no longer an aspirational product but became affordable to a larger section of the market.

The idea of ready to stitch jeans caught the attention of the consumers. The brand was highly successful in the initial phase of the lifecycle. Consumers liked the very relevant brand name and the price was the real game changer. For 299 one was able to afford a good quality jeans when the average prices of readymade brands was over Rs 700. The brand had the Bollywood Action Hero Akshay Kumar as the brand ambassador for Ruf N Tuf. These tactics made the sales of the brand soar during the initial phase of the brand's life.

The successful run of Ruf N Tuf did not last long. The brand faced significant problems from counterfeits which merely copied the brand elements and fooled the consumers. Ruf N Tuf tried to manage the counterfeits by embossing log on the jeans pocket but these measures found little success.
The brand then began to face another issue which is directly linked with its product performance. The idea behind Ruf N Tuf's business model is that the tailor will stitch the jeans in a way that is comparable with the readymade ones. That assumption proved wrong. Consumers began to feel that the tailors were not able to bring the finishing in a perfect manner compared to readymades. The local brand made use of this weakness by launching low quality jeans with good stitching and competitive price. This strategy of local brands virtually killed the market of Ruf N Tuf.

To counter the onslaught from local readymade brands, Ruf N Tuf reduced the quality of the product and tried to compete on price. That strategy too failed to click in the market. Since the market of Ruf N Tuf was highly price sensitive, the local brands took advantage of the weakness of Ruf N Tuf. The presence of Newport and Ruf N Tuf  started creating problems in the company's product line. These brands began to cannibalize each other despite having different distribution channels.

These issues created huge inventory issues for Arvind Mills during the early 2000 forcing the company to put Ruf N Tuf in the freezer. The brand was on the verge of being killed. In 2004, the company decided to rejuvenate the brand by associating with Big Bazaar. According to the arrangement, the brand will be available only through Big Bazaar. Thus Ruf N Tuf virtually became a private label ( not theoretically ).

The story of Ruf N Tuf provides some insights to the difficult task of marketing. The consumers loved the idea of a ready-to-stitch jeans  and the low price. But they are not ready to compromise on quality and fit. And the business model of Ruf N Tuf had no control on the tailor who made the final product. Hence the brand was not able to control the complete experience to the consumer which ultimately lead to the demise of the brand.

The next question is that if the ordinary shirtings and suitings can thrive then why not Ruf N Tuf ?  I think its because of the points of parity . Ruf N Tuf's point of parity was established with readymade Jeans and not textiles. Hence the consumers expected Ruf N Tuf to be having the same stitching quality as the readymade jeans.Hence the comparison with readymade jeans is inevitable.I think the brand could have carved a better market if it had established parity with denim clothing rather than readymade jeans.
The current strategy of associating with Big Bazaar ensures the survival of the brand. Through the extensive chain of stores, the brand rightly ensures that it reaches its desired TG through Big Bazaar. Big Bazaar offers instant reach to the bargain hunters and price conscious consumers. In that sense, the brand has struck on a workable strategy. Having said that , from a mainstream brand to a private label ( somewhat) it is a fall from grace. The solace is that the brand is still alive.

Monday, May 30, 2011

Koutons : 50% + 40% Off


Brand : Koutons
Company : Koutons Retail India Ltd

Brand Analysis Count : # 483

Koutons is a brand story which has gone sour. This 1000 crore corporate brand is now facing the worst period of its existence- facing mounting debt and bad press regarding the financial position and the stock price moving southward. 



Koutons , the brand owned by Koutons Retail India Ltd was born in 1991. The original name of the company was Charlie Creations which was later rechristened as Koutons. Koutons is both the corporate brand and an individual brand . The company has a range of readymades with the brand name Koutons. Along with it , the company also has other brands of clothings like Charlie Outlaw, Le Femme etc. The current post focuses more on the individual brand.

Koutons Retail is a classic entrepreneurial story. The company was founded by Mr. DPS Kohli. Mr Kohli and his family owned a television manufacturing business which was destroyed during a riot. Mr. Kohli  had to suffer huge financial losses from that even and had to work as an insurance surveyor for long . Later he ventured into the retail textile business.
Koutons grew really fast. The company became India's largest retail apparel chain in a span of 10 years . In 2009, the company had around 1400 Exclusive Brand Outlets (EBO) making it the largest apparel chain. The company had a turnover of around Rs 1000 crore in 2008-2009.

Koutons was a brand built on a very unique strategy - deep discounting. Deep discounting is a pricing strategy where the brand offers huge  ( often mind-blowing) discounts on an unusually high MRP ( Maximum Retail Price) . So the consumers are attracted towards the product seeing the huge discounts which are actually not a discount ( in pure sense). 
Koutons has a popular discount scheme  known as 50% + 40 % off. So there is a 50% off on the MRP and then another 40% off on the discounted price. So  the consumers obviously are delighted to get a shirt with an MRP of Rs 1500 for as low as Rs 450. Another very successful offer was " Buy 4 garments for the price of One ". Seeing this unbelievable offers , consumers flock into the showrooms and buy what ever that is available .
Along with the deep discounting strategy, the brand also invested some money in the brand building.Koutons has the tagline " The way ahead, always " . It had campaigns featuring foreign models and usually the showrooms are located in upmarket malls thus giving the impression that Koutons are a premium brand.  But frankly no one really knows whether Koutons really sells a shirt for Rs 1500. 
But nobody was complaining because consumers got a feeling to getting a good bargain and that is what matters. So this model worked well for the firm for more that 20 years. As usual, 20 years is pretty long time for consumers to learn the discounting model. The sales started drying up and the cost and inventory started building up. More discounts followed and revenues started sliding. The company landed itself into a financial trouble. ( source).
The brand really was able to tap the " value for money " psyche of the Indian consumer. Indian consumers like a good bargain and for long years, the firm was able to capture profit out of it. But the popularity of other discount outlets of established brands and the quality issues of Koutons paved the way for the downside for the brand. According to some newsreports, the company faced the issue of inventory mis-estimates and huge debts. 
I also have bought the brand believing that I got a good bargain later found that I was a victim of a very clever marketing strategy. Often some students ask me whether Koutons will lose its brand equity if it gives discounts like that, assuming that they sell the product at MRP atleast in some outlets. In the case of Koutons, they sell by these discounts.

In the deep discounting model, the brand is secondary. What matters is the  attractiveness of discounts and high media spents announcing the discounts. It is not the brand that pulls the customers but the perceived bargain. Ofcourse the consumers should feel that the brand is aspirational . So it is a kind of a very risky , clever strategy. Project aspirational image and use discounts to pull the consumer in.

Koutons as a company is in financial trouble and the fate of the brand depends on how the company survives the crisis. The deep discounting model will work in a market like India as long as the firm is able to project the aspirational image. It lacks the glamour of brand-building but may work for short-term. In the long term such deep discounting will eventually kill the brand. 

Friday, May 20, 2011

Brand Update : Barclaycard RIP ( 2008-2011 ?)

According to newspaper reports, the Barclay's Corporate which runs the credit card business has decided to put Barclaycard on the block. The report further suggest that Barclays is going to scale down its retail operations owing to the bad debts accumulated during recession. The unofficial number of creditcards of Barclays is put at 2.4 Million.
Barclaycard was launched with much fanfare. The brand offered several differentiators which was later matched by other players. The company was in the dilemma of choosing between high risk Vs growth. Finally it decided to sell of the credit-card business and concentrate on other banking domains. 
Credit card brands are a confused lot. On one hand they want the users to splurge  and on the other hand, they worry about bad debts. Greed makes these brands charge exorbitant charges which adds to bad debts. It is a vicious cycle.
Having said that, Barclays had a reasonably good business albeit small in market size. That may bring in some suitors who wanted to scale up their business. Barclaycard failed because the brand lacked the distribution reach which is essential to scale up. The recession add to its voes for fear of accumulating bad debts.
Anyways another brand is going to die. RIP

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Thursday, February 24, 2011

Brand Update : RIP Ford Ikon ( 1999-2011)

One of the best selling  car brands from Ford is being laid to rest this year. Ford has officially confirmed that the brand will be discontinued this year. Ford has cited the following reasons for the decision to pull the plug on Ford Ikon. The company wants to introduce new cars based on its global platform. Ford Ikon although was derived from earlier models of Fiesta is a car built for India. Hence no other models can come out of its platform. Now globally car markers are looking for making common platforms from which multiple car models can be built. 
Another reason perhaps may be that Ford think that Ikon has become old. The brand has been in the market for the last 12 years and consumers have seen lot of Ikon. Hence this familiarity may prevent further freshness/excitement about the brand.It is my assumption that the brand may not be able to fit into the Bharat Stage V emission norms. 

News reports also say that Ford is contemplating on bringing the Fiesta to the Ikon price band and then introduce another Fiesta variant - Fiesta Sedan at the premium end. 

So Ford Ikon is Dead.
The question is whether killing Ikon is a good marketing strategy or not. 

Theoretically every product moves through a lifecycle and eventually die. But there are brands which has been thriving for decades and still is fresh and alive. So in a branding perspective, only products die and brands live forever. Hence killing a popular young dashing brand Ikon may not be a good idea. And bringing Fiesta to take the place of Ikon also seems to be confusing brand strategy.

Ikon was a neglected brand in the Ford portfolio ever since the launch of Fiesta. In my earlier update on the brand, I had mentioned that the brand was not promoted or energized. In 2009, Ford made some cosmetic changes on Ikon and sort of relaunched it. But a very random non-systematic investment on brand will not yield results. Ikon should have been consistently promoted and nurtured. Ford did not do that and then complaining about the legacy  is just an excuse. Brands will survive above product lifecycle only through regular investment on promotion and innovation. Then even if products die, the brand will reinvent itself under new products. Here I am making a distinction between Brand and Product. 

Ford is now rejoicing in the new found success of Figo. The company seems to have identified the right product strategy and wants to capitalize on that by bringing in more globally compatible products like Figo. Ikon thus does not fit into the new found product strategy of Ford. 

The death of Ikon is opening up a vacant spot in the car market. The segment of a sporty sedan is now open and up for grabs but only for those who have willingness to invest for the longterm.

So RIP Ford Ikon, we miss you.


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Monday, November 8, 2010

Fryums : Eat Smart

Brand : Fryums
Company : TTK

Brand Analysis Count : 466


Fryums is a very interesting brand. Infact how many of us know that it is a brand ? Recently when two of my students visited my home, my wife served them a bowl of Fryums which invoked a sense of nostalgia and we discussed about this Indian snack which failed to fight the invasion of Lays.
Fryums was launched by TTK in 1990. This ready-to-cook Indian snack quickly gained popularity in the Indian market . The brand became so popular that soon consumers began to use the brand name as the generic name for such snacks.

Sometimes too much popularity can be bad for the brand. When brand names become generic, marketers should worry because there is a chance that they will lose the brand. The same happened with Fryums. Consumers started to refer to Fryums as a generic name for all such ready-to-fry snacks. Soon competitors also started using the term Fryums in their packs.

When consumers started using Fryums as generic name, retailers too made use of that opportunity to push the similar product that offered better margins. Soon Fryums became more of a commodity than a differentiated , protected brand.

Along with this unique problem came the competition from Lays. Fryums was not able to counter the competition from Lays. Lays were more up-market, aspirational, convenience and had more perceived quality than Fryums. The fact that one needs to fry this product in oil before use also made it less appealing to the younger generation .

From a generic brand , Fryums fell into oblivion. The brand soon went off the shelves or became one among the many " Fryums " at the stores. The company also was clueless about the future of this ' famous' brand.
However in 2000-2001, the brand went in for a makeover. Fryums was rebranded as Fryums Yummies and the brand had a new logo and even a mascot. In the new avataar, TTK tried to rev up the brand's fortune by launching it in new flavors and also in new product forms. But even this rebranding did not work in the favor of Fryums. The problem was that the brand did not have enough steam to fight the competitors.

Fryums 's issues highlight the need for marketers to fiercely protect their brands from becoming generic. The brand should pursue and protect itself from being used as a verb or as a category identifier. Once the brand become generic, there are chances that legally it cannot be protected by the owners. This fate happened with the likes of Aspirin.

There is future ahead for Fryums. The brand needs to reinvent itself and position itself as a healthy alternative to existing snackfoods. The brand is cholesterol free and contains no MSG or trans fats. The new flavors + new brand campaign can raise the interest about this Indian snackfood in the market.

Monday, August 30, 2010

Brand Update : Can Ambassador be saved ?

Recently the good old Ambassador was in the news that the brand owners - Hindustan Motors is planning to relaunch /rejuvenate this heritage brand. Both the brand and company is in deep crisis with HM posting losses of Rs 43 crore last year and its networth declining by about 50%.

The company plans to relaunch the Amby in a new look and is planning to entrust a design house with the task. The report also suggest that the new Amby will have a retro- look and will be in the price range of Rs 5- Rs 7 Lakhs. The new Amby will be a niche product.

The interesting question is can this brand be saved with the new strategy ?

From the report about the new Amby launch, it will be tough for the brand to regain its lost glory if the brand is going for a niche variant. According to Economic Times, Ambassador sells around 600 units per month in a market of 2 lakh cars/month.

Ambassador is now in a rut which is its own creation. The brand is the classic example of marketing myopia. The company took the customers for granted and refused to change when the entire market changed. The brand did nothing when faced with competition from Tatas and Maruti. Instead of changing its core DNA, the brand relied upon cosmetic changes. When the brand needed a drastic revolutionary change, HM decided to get stuck with the old product.

The current strategy of a niche Amby is again a patch-up . This brand cannot survive on patch-up strategies. I don't think that the core brand Ambassador will revive with the launch of a niche high priced Ambassador. With the brand equity in shambles, how can the brand expect consumers to pay a premium for the new Amby variant ?

The high priced Marquee variant will work for iconic brand which are facing a decline. But Ambassador was not an icon. It was a market leader and consumers bought the car because they did not had a choice. Not because they were a die-hard Amby fan. Hence a high priced niche variant may not revive the sale of Ambassador.

Secondly HM as a company is now relying its future on Ambassador which again is a flawed strategy. A weak brand cannot save a weak company. And a niche variant will at best give some life support and not survival.

Another way to look at the current strategy is the transformation of Amby from a mass market car to a niche product. So instead of trying to sell large volume of Ambassador, the company hopes to sell high-end variant and hence generate more cash. In that perspective, the launch of a high priced Amby make sense. But the question is whether the brand has enough equity to support such a variant. Brands like Beetle and Enfield revived because these brands had strong equity existing in the market even after its previous life. The relaunch re-ignited the existing goodwill . But such a goodwill does not exist for Ambassador. Ambassador is known for its space and rugged nature .The product is also infamous for nagging problems and poor build quality. Still people bought because there was no choice. For such a product, the hope of renewal from a niche product seems too optimistic.

Having said that, Indian market has seen consumers embracing products with exceptional quality and/or utility. So if the new variant is exceptional, there are chances of getting accepted by the market.

Another interesting aspect of this issue is about the reliance of HM on Ambassador brand for its survival. Why didn't it think about an entirely new brand ? The trend in the Indian auto market is that multiple brands from different companies sporting the same engine. The engine becoming commoditized and design gaining prominence. In such a market why not come out with an entirely new brand with a proven engine ? Although building new brand is expensive compared to rejuvenation of old brand, in Amby's case, Ambassador comes with a lot of baggage and perceptions which is difficult to change.

If Ambassador wants to stay relevant as a brand, what it need is disruption. Disruption should happen both internally and externally. The brand should go for radical redesign and more importantly it should disrupt the market. The current price to value proposition of Ambassador is negative compared to the competitors like Indica . So if Amby wants to play the volume game, it needs to offer consumer something they cannot refuse. A diesel car below Rs 4 lakh can ignite interest in the brand but given the cost scenario, such a task is virtually impossible.

HM is again going for short-term strategy in pursuit of long-term results. For Amby, it seems to be the end of road .

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Thursday, July 22, 2010

Mahindra Voyager : RIP ( 1997-2000)

Brand : Mahindra Voyager
Company : Mahindra & Mahindra

Brand Analysis Count : #459

Voyager was an ambitious brand, aiming to create a new segment in the Indian automobile industry. But rather than creating a new category, the brand went down the history as a failed one.
Voyager was Mahindra's foray into the consumer vehicles segment. The brand was created in collaboration with Mitsubishi Motors .Voyager was launched in India in 1997 and lived a very short life of a little over two years.

Voyager was India's first and perhaps the last luxury Multi-Purpose family van. The brand was positioned as a luxury family carrier and Mahindra hoped that the association with Mitsubishi will give enough reason to charge a premium .

Voyager was based on Mitsubishi's 1968 L300 van. Although the L300 is still in the market, Voyager failed to survive.

The van (MPV) segment in India was and is still dominated by Maruti Omni. The segment was a stagnant one . Indian consumers were never thrilled by the concept of a family van. One of the reason was the poor marketing and product development in that segment. Although some families own Omni, the main users of the van was in the commercial segment. Compared to cars, the van seldom offered a comfortable ride and there were issues regarding A/C and safety. Many consumers buy van for the functional benefit .

Mahindra felt that there is an opportunity for a premium family van. And thus born Voyager.

To begin with, Voyager had the support of one of the leading global automobile brands of that time in Mitsubishi. Voyager had a powerful engine and large space . But Voyager put off the consumer in two aspects - Design and Price.

More than the design, it was the price that killed Voyager. The base version of the brand was priced at Rs 5.25 lakh which was more than the price of a decent sedan. The arrogant pricing virtually scared away the Indian consumers. The consumer was not willing to pay that much money for a non-A/c vehicle.

Second factor that put-off the consumer was the design. Voyager was too boxy and Indian consumers did not like that design. Having said that, we have seen vehicles like Qualis thriving in the market despite poor looks. But in the case of Voyager, it could not boast about the quality , value or brand name.

Another aspect was the service factor. Mahindra and Mitsubishi were brands that are new to consumer market and there was suspicion about the level of service and after-sales support for the product.

The brand campaign was also not able to impress the consumer.The campaigns of Voyager essentially talked about the space and luxury but couldn't find any meaningful differentiator that justified the premium pricing of the brand. Consumers viewed Voyager as a functional product and not as a luxury one and that prevented consumers from paying a premium .

Distressed by the response from the individuals, Voyager aggressively pursued the commercial segment and became popular ( to certain extent) as ambulance vehicle. That was a final nail in the coffin. Voyager suddenly was branded as an ambulance vehicle which further distanced the individuals from the brand.

Indian consumers only have one reference point for vans i.e Maruti Omni. Omni is a highly functional product and its pricing also reflects that aspect. Voyager failed because it could not break away from that functional association . Neither the product design nor the benefits forced the consumers to think differently about the product. Since Voyager looked and felt like a van, it should also be priced like the van ( Omni) could have been the justification of the consumer while rejecting the brand.

Thursday, April 8, 2010

Brand Update : Bajaj XCD RIP ( 2007-2010)

According to Economic Times, Bajaj has stopped the production of XCD 125 and XCD 135. The brand which was touted to give Hero Honda Splendour a run for money has become a part of history. In my analysis of the brand, I had opined about the positioning problem faced by XCD.

I feel that the brand established wrong sets of parity with Pulsar and the total confusion resulting in the focus on the cubic capacity rather than the brand benefits resulted in the death of this brand. Bajaj later diluted the core positioning of the brand by launching a 125 version of Platina which again cannibalized XCD.

The list of failed brands in the Bajaj's portfolio is increasing every year. The ET article also cites the imminent death of Platina in the future.

I cannot understand where Bajaj Auto is running so fast. The company in a race to overtake Hero Honda in volume sales is killing itself. The rapid launch of new products and product failures are going to hurt the company in future. Now will an XCD/Caliber/Wind customer try their hand on any new Bajaj two wheelers ? How will we ever know when company will stop producing that brand.

XCD could have survived if the company gave time for the brand to settle down, rectified its flaws and invested in the brand. Out of the 2 years that the brand had, the investment on the brand may have stopped after one year.

Bajaj is still putting lot of stake in anchoring their products on the CC( Cubic capacity). My personal opinion is that for a customer CC is irrelevant. They will buy good products and not CC. Too much focus on CC has created lot of problems for Bajaj two wheeler brands.

Related Brand
Bajaj XCD

Thursday, March 25, 2010

Brand Update : Getz RIP (2004-2010)

Another brand is going to be laid to rest. According to news reports, Hyundai has decided to phase out Getz with in two months. The brand is already offered at steep discounts in dealerships across the country.

Getz was the first luxury hatch back to be launched in India. The brand in a way was far ahead of its time. It was launched in a market predominantly oriented towards sedans. The failure of Getz was because of two reasons :
a. Value Proposition
b. Positioning
c.Competition.

The failure of Getz and success of Swift are two sides of the same coin. Both brands belong to the same segment and almost in the same price band. But while Swift rocked the market, Getz had to bite the dust.

Getz when launched in the market was very aggressively priced. Infact the brand was priced at par with sedans like Ford Ikon and Indigo. Indian consumers were not able to understand the value proposition of a high priced Getz. The brand also was not able to tell the consumer as to why they should chose Getz compared to a Sedan. The problem with such a high pricing strategy is that it creates an impression in the consumer's mind which will be difficult to change. Theoretically this is called narrow positioning.

When Maruti launched Swift, Getz suffered because consumers perceived Swift to be a better value for money car compared to Getz. The reason is that consumers know that Maruti cars are less costly to maintain than Hyundai cars. Swift was bigger, sporty and competitively priced which put Getz in a very tough situation.

The campaigns for Getz was also way off the mark. The brand never had a clear positioning . When it was launched, there was no USP or differentiation. The brand started talking about fun then moved to space. So it lacked a clear brand identity which further accelerated the decline .

In marketing terms, we say that brand should offer some compelling reasons to customers to buy. Getz was not able to give any such compelling reasons. The brand had lot of design similarity with Zen which defied its pitch on premiumness. Swift had a radical design which created a newness to the brand.Getz did not have such a "wow" factor.

The recent launch of Hyundai i20 was the final nail in the coffin for Getz. i20 has more chance of survival because the segment of premium hatchback has now developed. Consumers are now aware of this segment and there is genuine consumer interest in this segment.

Getz could have reaped the benefit of the segment it had created , had it offered itself at the price range of Rs 3.5 - 4 lakh. ( I know it is easy to sit in my chair and suggest the pricing strategies). That price range could have done wonders for this brand.

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Friday, December 25, 2009

Brand Update : World Space RIP ( 2001-2009)

Another brand is dead. World Space satellite radio service is set to shut shop in India on the New Year eve. The brand which brought in the country's first satellite radio will officially laid to rest on that day.

The brand which came to India in 2001 was supposed to create ripples in the Indian entertainment market ( atleast I thought so). The brand was launched in India with a preposterous pricing soon realized that India needs a new set of marketing mixes if it wanted to succeed . In 2005, the brand came back with a reasonable price-value proposition. The new pricing helped the brand to earn large number of subscribers to the tune of 4.5 lakh customers who was willing to pay about Rs 1800 per year for music. This is no small feat because in India, it was unheard of a practice to pay for a radio service. The brand also got a boost with the tie-up with Airtel digital TV network. According to reports, World Space India contributed 90% of the subscriber base of its parent.

But luck was not in favor for World Space. In 2009, the parent company World Space USA filed for bankruptcy protection . That was the beginning of the end for World Space India. There was talks about a possible sell off but that too did not materialize.

The failure of World Space India was largely contributed by the bankruptcy of its parent but there are lessons to be learned from the mistakes of the Indian arm also. The first mistake was done during the initial launch when World Space charged exorbitant prices for its receiver as well as the service. The Indian consumers quickly rejected this aggression. The company did not correct this mistake for two years and when they corrected it, already a perception was created in the mind of the consumers about the service being expensive.
The second mistake was regarding the pricing of the receiver. World Space should have concentrated more on selling subscriptions rather than the receiver . It could have come out with receivers with rock bottom prices ( Say below Rs 1000) and aggressively sold subscriptions. Remember mobile services became popular largely because of the low cost handsets . Had the handsets cost more than Rs 5000, the penetration could have been much lower.

The third mistake was the business model. Although the brand did right in the advertising front by roping in the brand ambassador AR Rahman, the field level promotion was hopeless. This product could have done well with a direct marketing approach. But the channel partners of World Space did not bothered to aggressively push the product. They were all waiting for the consumers to make the first contact. The ideal strategy could have to set a subscription target of say 1 million customers and once you have it, then try to upsell premium subscriptions to them.

I don't think that the brand could have still survived if it had followed the above said strategies. Indian market still has not open to the concept of a Pay- Radio. The brand was in the wrong place at the wrong time...

Related Post
World Space

Monday, December 21, 2009

Brand Update : Bajaj Kristal RIP ( 2007-2010)

Bajaj recently announced its exit from the scooter market. This announcement also marked the death of the last scooter brand from Bajaj -- Bajaj Kristal. Kristal was launched in 2007 was aimed at capturing the scooterette market dominated by TVS Scooty.

The failure of Kristal was a marketing failure. The firm failed to launch a product that was well differentiated and offered value to the customer. I had written about the stiff pricing of Kristal which may have caused the pathetic response from the customers. Kristal was a half-hearted attempt which was visible in the way this brand was promoted. After the initial promotions, there was no voice for the brand. It was a brand crafted for failure.

Interestingly ,the announcement of Bajaj's exit from scooter market evoked lot of media attention. Channels devoted lot of prime-time discussing the Hamara Bajaj campaign and the death of icons. There was a lot of emotional brouhaha which was totally unnecessary because the exit from the market is a pure business decision. Although the top management of Bajaj was finding it difficult to explain the reasons for the exit, one should understand that Bajaj feels that scooters does not fit into their business model and decided to exit. Nothing more , Nothing less.

The fact remains that Bajaj was not able to either understand the consumer expectations in the scooter segment and develop appropriate product which is a setback to the company's image. The fact that new players like Mahindra scooters are entering the scooter segment adds to the insult and injury to the Bajaj brand.

Even in the case of motorcycles, Bajaj is not having a wonderful time. It had shown a spark of brilliance when Pulsar was introduced, but even after 9 years, Bajaj could not come out with another brand like Pulsar. What it is doing is to milk Pulsar to death.

Related Brand
Kristal

Thursday, September 3, 2009

Brand Update : Kelvinator

Marketing Practice reader Ms Simran asks an interesting question about Kelvinator. She wanted to know about the prospects of rejuvenation of Kelvinator brand.

In my earlier post on Kelvinator, I had predicted (assumed) that the brand will be killed after being acquired by Electrolux. To a certain exte
nt, it was true also because Kelvinator was sidelined for Electrolux brand. There was no brand promotion and the product was also not visible in stores.
Electrolux too had difficulty in surviving the highly competitive Indian consumer durable market. In 2005-06, Electrolux Kelvinator Ltd was acquired by the Videocon group ( source). The acquisition gave Videocon , the rights to use Electrolux brand for five years and Kelvinator brand for unlimited period. ( Source).

My prediction of Kelvinator's death was proved wrong. Videocon had other plans for this brand. The brand was rejuvenated in 2008-2009. Recently I saw the commercial of Kelvinator in one of the local Kerala channel. ( Watch the TVC here : Kelvinator)
The brand retains the famous classic positioning of " The Coolest One".

I think that Videocon is using Kelvinator as a flanker brand . Kelvinator will be the price warrior for the Videocon. Even after all these years, Kelvinator still have lot of brand recall. Vidoecon will just have to create some noise in the media to rejuvenate the brand . I am sure Kelvinator still have lot of potential to succeed in the Indian market.

It is good to see the good old Kelvinator back into the branding world. It is also wonderful to see the brand owners retaining the famous positioning and tagline which made Kelvinator famous.
Related Brand

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Brand Update : Zen RIP (1993-2009)

One of most popular Indian auto brands has been laid to rest. Maruti Zen is dead. On August 25, Maruti announced the launch of new Estilo. The Zen brand name has been taken off. Now there is only Maruti Estilo. ( Read news report here)

It is a sad moment for all brand enthusiasts. Zen was a wonderful brand. A brand which personified sportiness and performance. The old Zen owners still swear by the brand . The jelly bean shape, roomy interiors and the peppy performance gave Zen an unique identity.It was surprising to see Maruti messing up this wonderful brand and finally killing it .

Zen Estilo was launched in December 2006. The car is a refurbished version of an outdated Japanese car MR Wagon. The entire product was different from the old Zen. Maruti chose to use Zen as the primary brand and Estilo as the subbrand for the new product. The strategy was to retain the brand equity of Zen to drive the sales of the new product. But the strategy backfired.

In a way killing the Zen brand will be good for Estilo. For Estilo, association with Zen was a liability. Interms of style or performance, older Zen and Zen Estilo was miles apart. Those who checked out Zen Estilo expecting the same performance and sportiness of old Zen were visibly disappointed. Estilo was a different car with a different brand personality. Launching Estilo as Zen Estilo actually created a negative impact for the car because Estilo was more of a style oriented girlish car compared to the sporty Zen. Now Estilo is an independent brand and can develop its own persona. The new Estilo comes with a new look and a new K-Series engine.

It is sad that a wonderful brand like Zen was being killed without being fully utilized .

Related Posts
Zen

Friday, July 17, 2009

Brand Update :Margo

It has been a long time since I wrote about Margo. Margo was virtually silent all these years and I even thought that the brand was dead. Recently I was pleasantly surprised to see a television commercial for Margo. In the article I had recommended that the brand should take the help of a celebrity.

One of my readers had earlier pointed out that the brand had roped in Rani Mukherjee as the brand ambassador . It was the first time that I saw the ad of Margo featuring Rani.

Watch the commercial here : Margo TVC

I am not sure whether this is an old TVC . Reports suggest that Rani Mukharjee was roped in as brand ambassador in 2008.

I am glad that Margo is trying again for a comeback. I also appreciate the fact that the brand is relying on its heritage and the core advantage of " Neem " ingredient.
Margo faces two issues in this relaunch attempt. First is the product qualities. Margo is well known for its " Pungent Smell " and non-lathering properties. That perception is still there in the market. Hence the task for the brand is to change the product by changing fragrance and making it lather more. I have not used the new Margo , hence could not comment on the product features.

The second issue is with regard to the celebrity. Rani is not at her career best and that can have some negative influence on the current brand efforts. How ever, the fortunes of these bollywood celebrities are highly unpredictable. I had earlier commented that Aishwarya Roy is a better choice of a brand endorser than Kathrina Kaif. Further events have proved me wrong and now Kathrina Kaif is a hot property.

The message in the current Margo relaunch is also laudable. The brand is taking the risk of being branded as Mama's brand . The campaign is making this as the USP and banking on its heritage.

In a smart move, the brand has launched a Rs 5 sample pack which will enable lot of sampling for the brand. If the brand is able to prove its worth, Margo will once again will be on the growth path.

Let us wait and watch the response of consumers to the current relaunch.
Related Brand
Margo

Monday, July 6, 2009

Kinetic Honda : RIP (1972-2008)

Brand : Kinetic Honda
Company : Kinetic


Brand Analysis Count : 406

Kinetic is another sad Indian brand story. The brand which was once synonymous with Luna and gearless scooters is no more.

Kinetic as a corporate brand is not dead but Kinetic as a scooter brand has been laid to rest in 2008 after the take over by Mahindra & Mahindra.

Kinetic was born in 1972 with the launch of Kinetic Luna which became a generic name for Mopeds in the country. Later in 1985, Kinetic formed a joint venture with Honda to manufacture scooters in India. The company then launched India's first gearless scooter KH 100 which became a run away success in India.

Kinetic Honda was a premium scooter in its brighter days. I would say that this was the brand that gave the ladies in India - the luxury of travel.

Since the scooter was ungeared, Kinetic Honda became the favorite mode of transportation for the women folks. The scooter was reasonable for city use and ladies loved it. So despite the high price, the sales was rocketing like anything. The product was not really good. The engine was unresponsive and mileage was bad. But people loved it because it was ungeared and had an electric start.

Somewhere down the lane, things started to go wrong for Kinetic Honda. Kinetic Honda was limited by their JV Partner to focus only on Mopeds and Scooters. Since Honda had another JV with the Hero Group ( Hero Honda), Kinetic could not enter these markets. At one stage the competition became intense in the moped and scooter segment. TVS with their Scooty carved as significant chunk of Kinetic Honda's market share.

The joint-venture between Kinetic ( Firodia Group) and Honda faltered during 1998. Honda wanted to buy out Kinetic , but Firodia was not willing to sell stake ( Read a report here). Finally the JV ended with Honda exiting the venture.

The exit of Honda was a huge blow for the brand . The consumers were sceptic about the quality issues since everyone knew that Kinetic Honda 's main USP was its technology from Honda.
Kinetic Motors was not affected by the exit of Honda. Infact, the company became more aggressive after this break up.

The issue with Kinetic scooters was more than the Joint venture. The brand had its issues with Product , Price and Promotions.
Regarding the ungeared scooter segment, Kinetic Honda was never successful with its new products or upgradings. It is said that in automobile segment, 90% of success depends on the product and rest is in other marketing mix elements. Hence if the product is very good, then the chances of success is very high.

Kinetic was unlucky in this front. The brand was not myopic or complacent. Infact I was surprised at the number of products this company has launched over these years. The brand was working on new products but somehow the products was not successful in the market.

For example, in 1996-97, the company launched its scootterette Kinetic Pride but was withdrawn because the pillion ride was not comfortable. In 1997, the company launched a powerful scooter Marvel but the product failed in the market. In 1998, Kinetic launched its Y2K complaint version of Kinetic Honda. In 2002, the company launched Kinetic Nova and Kinetic Zing but both were not big hits.

After the split up with Honda, Kinetic ventured into motorcylce manufacturing and launched Kinetic Challenger in 2002. In 2003, the company stunned the auto world by launching 4 models at one go. Kinetic launched Kinetic Boss, GF170, City and Kinetic Velocity.

Again in 2003, Kinetic launched India's most expensive bike Aquila priced at Rs 1.15 lakh. The brand was launched in collaboration with Hyosang Motors. Surprisingly Aquila was well received by Indian consumers. But Kinetic was complacent in projecting Aquila as its flagship offering. Rather it played cold to the demand from the market and did not pursue the opportunity.

Despite doing these , Kinetic failed in gaining momentum in the Indian market. The nail in the coffin came when Honda launched its own scooter Activa.

If you look at the failure of Kinetic Honda, one of the reason was the price. While Kinetic Honda was ruling the market, consumers were willing to pay a higher price . But Kinetic continued its high price without giving additional value to the consumers. After the exit of Honda , the core product - Kinetic scooter never got any better. Kinetic also priced its new brands Nova and Marvel aggressively thus putting off consumers. Consumers never wanted to pay a high price for a brand which was yet to demonstrate its technical superiority on its own. The brand could have developed a product that convinced the consumers that Kinetic could stand on its own. TVS did that with its Victor and improved upon its image through Apache. But Kinetic never had such a product to showcase.

Kinetic failed in its motorcycle venture for the same reasons. The products had its own flaws and Kinetic was not aggressive in marketing its products convincing the customers that they are not just scooter makers. May be the brand tried too much in a short period of time.

The story of Kinetic did not end like that. During late 2000, the brand tried to make a come back by launching designer scooters under Italliano range. But again , the brand faltered in delivering world class product.The final product from Kinetic was Kinetic Flyte which got rave reviews from auto reviewers.

Kinetic is not a sad story . In 2008, Firodias decided to sell the scooter business to Mahindra & Mahindra. Soon after the take over, Mahindra decided to drop " Kinetic " brand from the products. That was the end of an era.

Kinetic group is still running strong with its businesses in automotive parts and is a leading supplier to Tata Motor's Nano project.

For consumers, the death of Kinetic is a death of an era. It is sad to see a home grown brand dying because it could not catch the pulse of the market and develop unique technology on its own.

Monday, June 15, 2009

Dollops : RIP (1989-1995)

Brand : Dollops
Company : Cadbury/HLL


Brand Analysis : 403


Dollops is another MNC brand that bite the dust in Indian market. This much hyped brand was launched in India in 1989 by Cadbury's in association with Brooke Bond. Dollops was one of the first high profile MNC brands to enter the Indian market.

Dollops gained instant consumer interest because of the endorsement from Cadbury's. The brand was positioned as a premium icecream and was able to make a significant hype during the launch.

Ice cream business at that time was dominated by local players and powerful brands like Kwality. Cadbury later found that the market was not as juicy as it thought to be. During 1993, Cadbury began the process of focusing more on its confectionery business.

This lead to the hiving off the unrelated businesses like ice creams. It was around that time Hindustan Lever Ltd began to aggressively pursue their interest in ice cream market. In an acquisition spree, HLL acquired Kwality and Dollops. Cadbury sold Dollops to HLL in 1993.

Typically, HLL played around with the brands it had acquired. HLL had its international Wall's brand which it was planning to launch along with Kwality and Dollops. HLL found that Kwality had a huge equity in the market and decided to keep that brand .

Dollops could not be fit into the planned portfolio strategy of HLL and had to be killed.By around 1995, Dollops was slowly eased out from the market.

Dollops had only a short life in the Indian market. Dollops shot into limelight only because of the Cadbury's brand endorsement. The brand was in a tough market which had even humbled the mighty HLL. For Cadbury's, Dollops became a liability when it chose to concentrate on its core business. For HLL, it was a costly exercise of killing a competing brand.

Dollops is a brand that failed not because of any product related reasons. Some of the flavors of Dollops were a hit with the consumers. It failed because of company related factors.

Picture courtsey : Business Line

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Brand Update : Liril

After a long long time, the iconic Liril is back. Yesterday I saw the new tvc for Liril. The campaign looks foreign, complete with foreign models and settings.

The new tvc talks about 2000 points in our body which when touched will refresh us!!!! The ad uses the theme of a playful interaction between a father and baby to drive home the power of touch and these 2000 sensitive body points.

The ad claims that using Liril will rejuvenate those 2000 body points to keep you FRESH...

Well... some brands will never learn from mistakes. After the dumping of the famous imagery of Liril girl and the waterfall, the brand has never recovered. The fall of this iconic brand was accelerated by some stupid campaigns like Uff Umma and mindless product-line extensions like Orange Liril.

Now comes another half-hearted attempt to rejuvenate the brand. Although the new ad has a touch of class, it does not gel with the brand image of Liril that we had in our mind.

Another interesting development is that the entire product has also being changed. The brand packaging has been changed to dark green and the shape of the soap is changed to rectangle.

I still don't understand why the brand has not thought about bringing back its iconic positioning on freshness and its brand element of waterfall and still famous music. I am not saying that the brand should exactly replicate the earlier ads but it can creatively take advantage of that brand image which is still there in the consumer's mind.

Liril's consumers has become old and the new generation does not know much about this brand. But the collective memory and images are still there in the consumer space. It is also interesting to note that no other brand has been able to take up the space of Liril. So there is still lot of opportunity for Liril but going by the new campaign, that opportunity has been wasted miserably.

As a consumer , I still miss this soap.



Related brand
Liril

Monday, May 11, 2009

Brand Update : Lacto Calamine (RIP)


After a long long time, there is some development for Lacto Calamine brand. This heritage brand was lying low with little or no support from the company.

This year, Nicholas Piramal decided to invest some energy into this age old personal care brand. The brand has been given a facelift, a new packaging and also a new positioning.
The brand has roped in the design consultant Elephant Strategy to revamp the brand. (read the design change report here)
The brand launched a variant containing Aloe Vera.

What is interesting is that the brand have coined a new term Skinsurance .Skinsurance means that the brand is providing protection ( insurance) for the skin. It is a smart positioning statement.
The report in the Exchange4Media site gives a disturbing news also. The brand name Lacto Calamine is going to be shortened to the initials LC . This is to facilitate further brand extensions.

The company feels that the brand name Lacto Calamine is constrained because the name indicates the contents Lacto ( Milk) and Calamine lotion. Hence the brand cannot be used for extensions. This brand is one of those brands whose name restricts the extension. Other examples are Thirty Plus & Band Aid.

The company plans to slowly rebrand Lacto Calamine to LC in a phased manner. At first, the new brand name LC and Lacto Calamine will appear together and gradually Lacto Calamine will be phased out . LC will then be an umbrella brand that will endorse a range of personal care products.

So for all practical purposes, Lacto Calamine brand is going to be killed. Instead we will have a meaningless Two Letters LC.

I don't understand why Lacto Calamine brand has to be killed for a new umbrella brandname which is just a meaningless initial. Piramal could have easily launched a new brand for personal care products. Shortening Lacto Calamine to LC will not add any value and will not trasfer any equity to the shortened brand name. It is going to be just a waste of valuable promotional money.
Lacto Calamine is a niche brand. I think the company should have made it a profitable niche. Lacto Calamine is a good product with lot of good properties. It had the equity to remain a profitable niche but the firm think that it is better to convert it to a umbrella brand.

What the company should have done was to introduce a new meaningful umbrella brand for personal care products. It could easily integrate the Lacto Calamine brand into the new brand folio by endorsing Lacto Calamine by the new umbrella brand.

So RIP Lacto Calamine ( 1970-2009)


Related Brand
Lacto Calamine


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